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PUBLIC POLICY AND THE LAW RELATING TO
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE*
by

Charles J. Morris**

I

APPROACH the subject of this paper by cautioning that the monolithic implication of the title is deceptive. It is questionable whether
there is a public policy relating to collective bargaining in the public service, because a settled community attitude, implicit in any statement of public policy, is totally lacking. If public policy could be discovered, however,
its substance would be a mosaic of many policies scattered among numerous governmental jurisdictions, both state and federal. Any attempt to
define the law applicable to public employee collective bargaining encounters not only this expected problem of diversity but also an almost hopeless task of crystallizing a statement of the law prevailing in any given
jurisdiction. This crystallization is not easily achieved because the lawor laws-affecting the rights and liabilities of public employees with regard to collective bargaining and the forms and implications of such bargaining are now undergoing substantial metamorphosis.
These changes are taking place not only in the legislative and judicial
forums but also in the popular forum, where the operation of a law may
show little resemblance to the letter of the law. This has been particularly
evident in the operation of state laws prohibiting strikes among public employees. Notwithstanding such prohibitions, strikes have been occurring
with increasing frequency' and, from the standpoint of the employees and
unions involved, with increasing success, although it is unlikely that any
of these strikes would be termed successful from the standpoint of the immediate welfare or convenience of the public. From such experiences, both
the public and the public officials concerned should have learned that however desirable it may be to prohibit strikes in the public sector, merely
passing a law outlawing such strikes may not be the best way to prevent
them. In fact, the very existence of laws prohibiting such strikes, and particularly laws providing no adequate substitute, often serves to stimulate
rather than deter strike activity among public employees.
Note the experience in New York. In 1947 the Condon-Wadlin Act'
was passed. It emphasized harsh penalties for public employees who engaged in a strike. Notwithstanding those penalties, numerous strikes-most
notably the New York City transit strike of 1966--did occur. That
* This paper was presented at a Seminar on Collective Bargaining in the Public Service, sponsored by the Joint University Center for Community Services (North Texas State University and
Texas Women's University) at Denton, Texas, on March 7, 1968.
** B.A., Temple University; LL.B., Columbia University. Visiting Professor of Law, Southern
Methodist University.
IFederal and state laws are discussed in the text accompanying notes 30-48 infra.
a For a general discussion of the rash of strikes in the public sector, see TIME, March 1, 1968,
at 34.
'Law of 1947, ch. 391, § 22-a, [1947] N.Y. Laws 842 [repealed 1958] (then N.Y. Civ.
SERv. LAw § 108 (McKinney 1959) (repealed 1967)).
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twelve-day strike cost New Yorkers an estimated one billion dollars, mainly in lost wages and retail sales.4 An injunction against the strike and the
imprisonment of its leaders for contempt proved futile. In 1967 Condon-

Wadlin was replaced by the Taylor Act.' This new law guaranteed public
employees the right to organize and to engage in collective negotiations,"
established a system of mediation and fact-finding to aid in settling public
employee labor disputes,' and provided severe penalties against unions responsible for public employee strikes.! However, the Taylor Act's fate was
easy to predict. As one commentator put it:
[T]he president of the New York teachers' union could be sent to prison for

ordering a violation of the no strike order. If he is not, this will make a dead
letter of the law upon the first instance of its being tested. But if he is sent
to prison, he will become a martyr, and greatly enhance the cause of the
public employee, making him willing to strike again, even in violation of
the law.'
This prediction became fact when 49,000 New York teachers struck in
September 1967.1" Their strike lasted almost three weeks, their union was
fined $150,000, and their local union president, Albert Shanker, served fifteen days in jail." This bold strike achieved a significant breakthrough in
public sector labor relations" by demonstrating to schoolteachers all over
the nation that collective bargaining, backed by a willingness to strike,
could achieve for them what lofty ideals and tax-conscious school boards
ordinarily could not deliver." Thus, the no-strike provisions of the Taylor
Act were relegated, like the corresponding provisions of Condon-Wadlin
and like "prohibition" under the Volstead Act," to the assemblage of laws
which have been more honored in their breach than in their observance."
4

ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 492 (Annual Supp. 1967).
Civ. SERV. LAW §5 200-12 (McKinney Supp. 1967).

'N.Y.
7O1d.

S 202.
Id. S 205.
8id. SS 210-11.
'Fleming, Quad Briefs, 12 Law Quad. Notes (# 1), at 2 (Dec. 13, 1967) [Univ. of Mich.
Law School Publication].
"N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1967, at 52, col. 1.
"Raskin,
How To Avoid Strikes by Garbagemen, Nurses, Teachers, Subwaymen, Welfare
Workers, Etc., New York Times Magazine, Feb. 25, 1968, at 34. As this Article goes to press,
the New York City schoolteachers-53,000 of them out of 57,000-are once again on strike
under the leadership of Albert Shanker, who commented "that the strike would be 'bigger and
more effective' than any before. . . . [W]e must get complete protection for the teachers before
we go back." N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1968, at 53, col. 3 (city ed.). With regard to the consequences of the strike, he stated, "I did not enjoy the fifteen days I spent in jail for last year's
strike and I'm sure I won't enjoy it next time .
N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1968, at 1, col. 8
(city ed.).
"N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1967, at 52, col. 1.
isThe delegates to the Representative Assembly of the Association of Classroom Teachers in
1968 heard the retiring ACT President predict "greater militancy than we -have seen even in
1967-responsible militancy . . . classroom teachers and militant professional' associations ready
to fight for those conditions that provide high-quality education for children." NEA Reporter,
July 19, 1968, at 3, col. 1. The ACT delegates passed a resolution recognizing the right of teachers to withdraw services in cases "(a) where conditions make it impossible for teachers to provide
quality education, (b) where alternate means to rectify such conditions have been conscientiously
explored, and (c) where solutions have been proposed but not consummated." The resolution
further called on local and state associations to work to obtain repeal of state laws prohibiting
withdrawal of services. NEA Reporter, July 19, 1968, at 3, col. 2.
"National Prohibition Act of 1919, ch. 85, § 1, 41 Star. 305.
" For a more optimistic appraisal of the no-strike provisions of the Taylor Act, see Raskin,
supra note 11, at 34.
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Other New York city employees also took notice. The president of State,
County and Municipal Employees Union, District 37, which represented
50,000 employees of the City of New York, announced that "[i]f Al
Shanker goes to jail, the pressure is on others, too. It becomes a dare, like
a threat to knock the chip off my shoulder."'" Indeed, the threat of jail
failed to forestall a nine-day strike by New York City's sanitation employees, a strike which created a political stench that permeated far beyond
that metropolis. 7
The New York experiences were dramatic but not unique. In 1966
there were 142 strikes by public employees throughout the United States.
In 1967 the figure climbed to more than 250," all of which were technically illegal. In the state of Florida, for instance, where schoolteachers
may not lawfully strike 9 and where, unlike New York, there has never
been a strong labor union tradition, several thousand teachers under the
leadership of their "professional association"' recently joined in a statewide "mass resignation." The public, however, called this action a strike. 1
And in the state of Tennessee the issuance of an injunction"' did not deter
the sanitation employees of Memphis from following the example of their
New York brethren with a prolonged and bitter strike.'
This breakdown of state laws' which forbid strikes by public employees
presents a weighty social problem. Although the states, through their
police power, have the legal authority to legislate against work stoppages

that endanger the health, safety, and welfare of the public, 2 our present
concern is more with enforceability than with authority. An unenforce"OMissouri Teamster, Feb. 16, 1968, at 4, col. 5.
'"N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1968, at 1, col. 6 (city ed.). In appraising the no-strike provision
of the Taylor Act, it should be noted that some commentators feel that it was not adequately
tested in the teachers' and sanitation workers' strikes because the teachers' dispute was in its
critical phase before the law became effective, and the sanitation dispute was in the purview of
New York City's new Office of Collective Bargaining. N.Y. Times, May 5, 1968, at 82, col. 1
(city ed.).
"S TIME, March 1, 1968, at 34.
"9FLA. STAT. ANN. § 839.221 (1965).
20The Florida Education Association is the National Education Association affiliate in Florida.
2 Hechinger, Florida Strike Is a Test for the Militant Teacher, N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1968,
§ E, at 11, col. 1.
" Tennessee has no statute prohibiting strikes by public employees. In the Memphis strike of
sanitation workers beginning in February, 1968, Mayor Loen obtained an extension of a state
court's injunction issued in 1966 against strikes by the American Federation of State, County
and Municipal Employees. N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1968, at 27, col. 1 (city ed.).
" It was the Memphis sanitationmen's strike which brought the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr., to Memphis, where he was assassinated on April 4, 1968. N.Y. Times, April 5, 1968,
at 44, Col. 1 (city ed.). His death was a harsh price to pay for the agreement of April 16, 1968,
ending the two-month strike and insuring union recognition to the sanitationmen. N.Y. Times,
April 17, 1968, at 1, col. 2 (city ed.).
" Laws forbidding public employee strikes are increasingly failing to command voluntary
compliance, and compulsory enforcement is proving politically unfeasible. However, this observation is not applicable to federal employment. See note 36 infra, and discussion in part II
infra. There may also be a difference, though only in degree and timing, among various states
depending upon the strength and militancy of their respective labor union traditions.
2 For a discussion of the scope of a state's police power, see Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197
U.S. 11, 25 (1905). In City of Detroit v. Street Employees Div. 26, 332 Mich. 237, 51 N.W.2d
228, appeal dismissed, 344 U.S. 805 (1952), the Supreme Court of Michigan upheld the constitutionality of a statute forbidding public employees from striking. Cf. Dorchy v. Kansas, 272
U.S. 306, 311 (1926), in which Mr. Justice Brandeis wrote that "Neither the common law, nor
the 14th Amendment, confers the absolute right to strike."
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able law is a bad law."0 The argument that the law should be obeyed
may be correct in the abstract. But tested pragmatically, if the rule of law
is to work, the law itself must be workable. When laws are inherently unenforceable they serve only to repudiate the basic legal system, and public
respect for law and order is undermined. The problem, therefore, is to devise workable statutes which safeguard both the welfare of the public and
the welfare of the public employee.
To this end, this commentary will (1) explore why existing state laws
against strikes by public employees are generally ineffective; (2) attempt
to define what public policy in this area ought to be; and (3) attempt to
outline the essentials of a statutory scheme which might implement that
policy.

I.

UNIONIZATION

OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES AND

THE INSTITUTION

OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

Why have the laws prohibiting strikes by public employees so often
failed? Why did New York's seemingly comprehensive Taylor Act, designed to guarantee the benefits of collective bargaining to public employees while also protecting the public from strikes, break down?
According to mediator Theodore W. Kheel, an on-the-scene observer,
"the [Taylor] law appears to invite unions to threaten to violate the law
... .By prohibiting strikes of public employees, the law eliminates collective bargaining, which implies the right of the buyer or seller to refuse
to buy or sell by a strike or a lockout."2 The right of a union to strike,"'
and to a lesser extent, the right of an employer to lock out,"' are generally
considered essential to collective bargaining in the private sector. But are
they also essential in the public sector? This is the basic question which
must be faced in attempting to devise a system of collective bargaining for
public employees.
Before such an attempt is made, however, the present situation should
be dissected and the divergent parts bared to realistic scrutiny. In particular, existing state laws should be examined in the light of the extent of
public employee unionism, the factors stimulating the growth of unions
in the public sector, and the example of collective bargaining in the private sector.
2"From a sociological standpoint, an unenforceable law may not even be a law, if a law is
defined as:
[A] rule of human conduct that the bulk of the members of a given politica.l community recognize as binding upon all its members-this recognition being induced
by certain factors such as a general obedience to the rule, the organization of sanctions for its enforcement and of procedures for its interpretation and application,
and a general conviction of the rightness of the rule (or of the end it is apparently designed to promote), especially when this conviction is reinforced by the
knowledge that others believe it right or at least act in accordance with it.
A DICTIONARY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCEs 378 (J. Gould & W. Kalb eds. 1964). And see TIME,
March 1, 1968, at 34.
" N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1968, § 1, at 1, cols. 2, 3.
"'Recognized in the National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), § 13, 49 Stat. 457 (1935),
as amended, 29 U.S.C. 5 163 (1964).
"See American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965); NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S.

278 (1965).
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Framework of Existing Law. Although the organization of public employees into unions is not new,"° collective bargaining in the public sector is
of recent origin. At the state level, Wisconsin, in 1959, was first to formalize the process.3 In the federal service unions until recently generally relied
upon lobbying and political influence as the only means of achieving their
economic goals." This pattern of union activity was changed to some extent by President Kennedy's issuance of Executive Order No. 10988 in
1962. '" That order granted federal employees the right to form, join, and
assist any employee organization, to refrain from engaging in such activity,
and provided for various forms of union recognition.' It also provided
for limited collective negotiations as to working conditions, standards for
promotion, grievance procedures, and as to other matters which did not
conflict with merit system principles or infringe upon an agency's mission,
budget, organization and assignment of personnel, or the technology under
which its work is performed.' Federal employees are prohibited from striking by explicit statutory provisions. 0 Executive Order No. 10988 naturally spurred the growth of unionism among federal employees. Additionally, in conjunction with Wisconsin's pioneering statute of 1959, the
Order set the stage for a spurt of state legislation establishing specialized
forms of collective bargaining for unions representing public employees
at the state and local level.'
Several states, within the last few years, have passed detailed statutes
which (1) protect the right of public employees to engage in or to refrain
from engaging in union activity, (2) provide for recognition of unions in
public employee bargaining units and for collective bargaining by these
" Federal employees have had local union representation since 1863; the National Association
of Letter Carriers was organized in 1889. Note, Labor Relations in the Public Service, 75 HARV.
L. REV. 391, 392 (1961). And see R. Doherty, MAILMAN, U.S.A. 31 (1960).
"WIs. STAT. ANN. § 111.70 (Supp. 1968).
" For years public employees, both state and federal, have engaged in political lobbying to
obtain concessions from their public employers. For example, this method has been used successfully by the firefighters in Texas to exact detailed legislation covering working conditions for
both firemen and policemen. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1269m (1963).
"327 Fed. Reg. 551 (1962).
4
S 1d.
I (a), at 551.
351d. § 6(b), at 553. For a general discussion of Executive Order 10988, see Anderson, The
U. S. Experience in Collective Bargaining in Public Employment, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN
THE PUBLIC SERVICE: THEORY AND PRACTICE 21, 24 (K. Warner ed. 1967); Stieber, Collective
Bargaining in the Public Sector, in CHALLENGES TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 65, 69 (L. Ulman

ed.

1967); Wallerstein,

Labor Relations in Public Employment-The Federal Experience, in

N.Y.U. NINETEENTH ANNUAL

CONFERENCE ON

LABOR 205

(1967).

a'
U.S.C. §§ 118p-r (1964) (repealing and replacing § 305 of the Taft-Hartley Act, 61
Stat. 160 (1947)). According to Thomas R. Donahue, Assistant Secretary of Labor for Labor
Management Services, the absence of strikes in federal service is not entirely attributable to the
existence of punitive federal laws. He credits instead "the soundness of the system laid down
under Executive Order 10988," which, in his view, "has improved two-way communications,
resulted in increased union membership, and generally brought about better collaboration between
union and management toward the joint resolution of problems." Paper presented at the Conference on Public Employee Unionism, in 67 LAB. REL. REP. 348 (1968). See part II infra
for the writer's view.
"See
Stieber, Collective Bargaining in the Public Sector, in CHALLENGES TO COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING 65, 68 (L. Ulman ed. 1967). Such state legislation has an impact on union growth.
For example, under New York's Taylor Act, N.Y. CIv. SERV. LAW §§ 200-12 (McKinney Supp.
1967), 600,000 of a total of 900,000 state and local public employees are now represented by
unions. According to Dr. Robert D. Helsby, Chairman of the New York Public Employment
Relations Board, 260,000 public employees have exercised their rights of union representation
since the law went into effect. N.Y. Times, May 5, 1968, at 82, col. 1 (city ed.).
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unions, aided by various forms of mediation and fact finding but without
the right to strike, and (3) establish administrative machinery to enforce
and administer these provisions." In still other states similar provisions
have been extended to selected public employee groups." Several additional
states guarantee public employees a statutory right to belong or not to belong to a labor union."0 However, most states have no statutes expressly
governing the right of public employees to belong to labor unions or to
engage in collective bargaining.
The Texas Act is a study in inconsistencies. 1 It, like New York's Condon-Wadlin Act and several similar statutes in other states,' was passed in
1947, the year Taft-Hartley and many of the state "right-to-work" laws
were enacted. The Act prohibits a public body from entering into a collective bargaining contract ' or from recognizing a labor organization as
bargaining agent for any group of public employees." But the same Act
guarantees (1) that public employment shall not be denied "by reason of

membership or nonmembership in a labor organization," and (2) that
public employees shall have the right "to present grievances concerning
their wages, hours of work, or conditions of work" through a union representative (so long as it does not claim the right to strike)."' A recent
sNine states having labor relations acts for employees in the private sector have passed
comprehensive public employee labor relations acts: Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 7-466
to 477 (1966) (Municipal Employees, enacted 1965) and CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 10-153b to f
(Supp. 1965) (Teachers and Superintendents, enacted 1965); Massachusetts, MAss. ANN. LAws
ch. 149, §§ 178G-N (Supp. 1967) (Municipal Employees Relations Act, enacted 1965) and
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 149, § 178F (Supp. 1967) (Collective Bargaining by State Employees,
enacted 1964); Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 423.201-216 (1967) (Public Employment Relations Act, enacted 1947, amended 1965) ("Hutchinson Act"); Minnesota, MINN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 179.50-58 (1966)
(Public Employee Labor Relations Act, enacted 1965); New
York, N.Y. Civ. SERv. LAW §§ 200-12 (McKinney Supp. 1967) (Public Employee's Fair Employment Act, enacted 1967); Oregon, ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 243.710-.780 (1967)
(Public Employee's Rights and Benefits, Collective Bargaining, enacted 1963); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS
§§ 28-9.1-1 to 14 (Supp. 1966) (Fire Fighters' Arbitration Act, enacted 1961) and RI. GEN.
LAWS §§ 28-9.2-1 to 14 (Supp. 1966)
(Policemen's Arbitration Act, enacted 1963) and R.I.
GEN. LAWS §§ 28-9.3-1 to 16 (Supp. 1966) (School Teachers' Arbitration Act, enacted 1966)
and R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 28-9.4-1 to 19 (Sp. Supp. 1967) (Municipal Employees' Arbitration Act,
enacted 1967) and R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 36-11-1 to 6 (Supp. 1967) (Organization of State Employees, enacted 1966); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 1701-05 (Supp. 1968) (Collective
Bargaining in Certain Public Employment); Wisconsin, WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.80-94 (Supp.
1967) (State Employment Labor Relations Act, enacted 1965). Three additional states have
enacted public employee labor relations acts also: Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, §§ 1301-1313
(Supp. 1966); Missouri, Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 105.500-530 (Supp. 1967); Washington, WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. tit. 41 (Supp. 1967, app. 41.1) (Law of 1967, Ex. Sess., ch. 108, §§ 1-14, effective
July, 1967).
9 E.g., Illinois,
ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 111 2/3, § 328a (1966)
(metropolitan transit employees); Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 23, § 890 (Supp. 1967) (public transportation
employees); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 26, §§ 980-92 (Supp. 1967) (fire fighters);
Maryland, MD. CODE ANN. arts. 64B, §§ 7(S), 14(L) (1968) (metropolitan transit employees);
Wyoming, Wyo. STAT. §§ 27-265 to 273 (1967) (fire fighters).
' Alabama, ALA. STAT. §§ 23.40.010-.060 (1962) (public employees); California, CAL. ED.
CODE §§ 13080-88 (West Supp. 1967) (teachers), CAL. Gov. CODE §§ 3500-08 (West 1966)
(public employees), and CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 1960-63 (West Supp. 1967) (fire fighters);
Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 174.01-26 (1966); New Jersey, N.J. CONST. art. I, § 19; Texas,
TEX. REV. Cirv. STAT. ANN. art. 5154c, § 4 (1962).
4" TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5154c (1962).
'E.g.,
Michigan's Hutchinson Act, MICH. COMp. LAws ANN. §§ 423.201-216 (1967).
45
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5154c, § 1 (1962).
4Id.
§ 2.
4BId. § 4.
4" Id. § 6. Strikes and organized work stoppages of public employees are expressly prohibited.

Id. § 3.
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Texas statute compounded the inconsistency by permitting governmental
employers to check-off union dues for their employees,47 but recognition
of, or collective bargaining with, the union-recipient of the dues is still
legally unavailable."
The minimum rights extended by the Texas statute-the right of public employees to belong to unions and to present grievances-are essentially
the rights of free speech, assembly, and petition which should be protected
by the United States Constitution regardless of statute. If so, the right of
a Texas public employee to belong to a labor organization would be basically the same as that of a Memphis garbage collector in the state of Tennessee, where such an explicit statutory right does not exist. Although a
direct test of such rights may never be presented, several recent Supreme
Court decisions imply that they are guaranteed by the first and fourteenth
amendments.
In NAACP v. Alabama4 the Supreme Court, noting the "close nexus
between the freedoms of speech and assembly," struck down a state statute
which required disclosure of an organization's membership. The Court emphasized that "[e]ffective advocacy of both public and private points of
view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association . . . ."" In Shelton v. Tucker," a case involving an Arkansas statute that required school teachers to disclose every organization to which
they had belonged or regularly contributed, the Court declared that "to
compel a teacher to disclose his every associational tie is to impair that
teacher's right of free association, a right closely allied to freedom of speech
and a right which, like free speech, lies at the foundation of a free society."" The court, therefore, held the statute invalid under the fourteenth
amendment, though recognizing that the state's legitimate objective of
protecting itself from incompetent teachers could be achieved by more
specific means which would not broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties.
In Keyishian v. Board of Regents"a the Court declared that "the theory
that public employment which may be denied altogether may be subjected
to any conditions, regardless of how unreasonable, has been uniformly rejected." This view was reconfirmed in Pickering v. Board of Education,"4
decided at the close of the last term of Court. The latter case involved the
dismissal of an Illinois schoolteacher because he had written and published
47

TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-3a

(Supp.

1967).

48Passage in 1967 of the dues check-off statute and another statute providing for "consultative agreements" for public school teachers, TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2781a (Supp.
1967), indicates a faint legislative trend favorable--or at least less hostile--to public employee
organization in Texas.
49357 U.S. 449 (1958).
50 Id. at 460.

"'364 U.S. 479 (1960). Cf. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
"364 U.S. at 485-86.
"385 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1967).
4
Pickering v. Board of Educ., 88 S. Ct. 1731 (1968). And see Watts v. Seward School Bd.,
88 S. Ct. 1753 (1968), a per curiarn opinion vacating and remanding for further consideration in
light of Pickering. The facts in Walts involved a form of concerted activity--solicitation among
teachers to effect the ouster of a school superintendent and circulation of a letter containing
allegedly false charges-for which the sponsoring teachers were fired.
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a letter critical of the school board. The dismissal occurred after the board
had determined, following a full hearing, that the letter contained several
false statements which unjustifiably impugned the "motives, honesty, in-

tegrity, truthfulness, responsibility and competence" of the school administrators and board members and damaged their professional reputations.
Accepting the fact that some of the statements were untrue, the Supreme
Court reversed the state court's affirmation of the dismissal, holding "that
in a case such as this, absent proof of false statements knowingly or reck-

lessly made by him, a teacher's exercise of his right to speak on issues of
public importance may not furnish the basis for his dismissal from public
employment."" The Court thus applied the libel standard first announced
in New York Times v. Sullivan," based upon the "public interest in having free and unhindered debate on matters of public importance." '' The
Court's statement of the problem. in Pickering suggests the test which
would be applicable to the rights of public employees to belong to labor
unions and to present grievances relating to their employment: "The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the teacher,
as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public
services it performs through its employees."'"
I would conclude from these cases that public employees have a constitutional right to organize into labor unions and that they may petition
their employer through these unions on matters concerning conditions of
their employment. This conclusion provides the legal frame of reference
for the search for policy and law, outlined later, relating to collective
bargaining in the public service.

Growth and Stimulus of Public Employee Unions. A less theoretical frame
of reference is the fact that public employees are organizing themselvesin unprecedented numbers-into unions regardless of the presence or absence of statute. Garbage collectors, teachers, transit workers, and other
public employees by the hundreds of thousands have begun to organize,
either by joining labor unions or by converting their existing "associations"
into more militant organizations that take on many characteristics of traditional labor unions." Unions representing employees in the public sector
are the fastest growing unions in the nation'°-the two largest have quadrupled in size in the last dozen years-and there is every indication that
the growth trend will continue."
55 88 S. Ct. at 1738.

"6376 U.S. 254 (1964).
'788 S. Ct. at 1737.
slid. at 1734-35.
59For example, the National Education Association is becoming more militant and willing to
use the strike as a means of improving conditions. At its 1968 convention -[t]he 7,103 delegates
frequently expressed their approval of teacher militancy-in their applause for reports of action
in Florida in the past year, in their approval of building up the DuShane Fund for Teacher
Rights direcdy from the Association budget, and in their vote to approve teacher strikes as a
last-resort mechanism in educational struggles." NEA Reporter, July 19, 1968, at 1, col. 3.
"Stieber, Collective Bargaining in the Public Sector, in CHALLENGES TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 65

(L. Ulman ed. 1967).

61Membership in the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees increased
from 82,737 in 1951 to an estimated membership of 350,000 in 1967. During the same period,
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Once organized, these employees are bound to seek an outlet for effective
participation in the process which determines their compensation and
working conditions. Whether the public likes it or not, the demands of
these burgeoning unions will be for some form of collective bargaining.
Now that significant numbers of public employees have tasted the fruits
of such bargaining, its popularity can only increase.
The question of whether collective bargaining should be used by government employees is now moot. The vital question, therefore, is how
shall collective bargaining be used? If thoughtful and workable legislation
is not devised, some form of collective bargaining will probably develop
anyway, but it will be in response to ad hoc displays of raw strike power
and the politics of expediency.
Lest there be any doubt about the mootness of the former question, we
need only to examine the factors which are stimulating the popularity of
militant unionism in the public sector. At state and local levels, public employees generally earn considerably less than employees performing com-

parable work in private employment." As the ranks of government employees increase-the number is now about twelve million and expected to
reach fifteen million within the next seven yearsa-public employees and
their unions will seek a larger slice of the economic pie. It is only natural
that these unions will turn to means which have been effective in the past,
albeit in the private sector, to achieve these economic goals. Hence, collective bargaining (i.e., bargaining demands backed by strike or threat of
strike) will be their choice of weapon. Assuming that such a choice would
eventually yield wages comparable to those prevailing in the private sector, would the process also seriously harm the public? Is it possible to
avoid extortionate settlements and paralyzing work stoppages affecting
vital public services under a system of public employee collective bargaining? In large measure, the answer will depend upon the system.
The Example of Collective Bargaining in the Private Sector. While much
can be learned from the example of industrial relations in the private sector, even private sector collective bargaining has had its conspicuous failures. Although collective bargaining has provided stability in most industries, the system often has broken down in disputes where vital public services were at stake. 4 The major disputes machinery of both the Taft-Hartley Act"a and the Railway Labor Act 6 has not always been adequate to
membership in the American Federation of Governmental employees increased from 55,398 to
250,000. Donoian, The AFGE and the AFSCME: Labor's Hope for the Future?, 18 LAB. L.J.
727, 729-30

(1967).

""The relatively unfavorable earnings and fringe benefits of government employees in many
states as compared with private industry provide a fertile field for cultivation by unions." Stieber,
Collective Bargaining in the Public Sector, in CHALLENGES TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 65, 69
(L. Ulman ed. 1967).
63TIME, March 1, 1968, at 34.
64 Labor disputes affecting vital services are analyzed in Aaron, Emergency Dispute Settlement,
LABOR LAW DEVELOP'MENTS-1967, at 185 (1967), and
Williams, Settlement of Labor Disputes in Industries Affected with a National Interest, 49 A.B.A.J.
862 (1963).
" Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 141-97 (1964).
6645 U.$.C. §§ 151-88 (1964).
in SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION,
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cope with the big strike, particularly in such key industries as air and rail
transportation and in the maritime services. 7 Notwithstanding an obvious need to modify private collective bargaining to accommodate it to
changing economic conditions-occasioned by advancements in technology,
concentration of bargaining by multi-employer and multi-union groups,
and the impact of regulated monopoly industry on our complex and interdependent way of life-collective bargaining will probably continue to
be the chief regulator of private sector industrial relations for the foreseeable future. Whatever the shortcomings of collective bargaining, the
alternatives are considered less appealing."
We should be acutely aware of the shortcomings of collective bargaining
when we attempt to adapt this system for use in the public sector; however, we also should recognize the very solid achievements of the institution. As John T. Dunlop asserted:
[O]ur collective bargaining system must be classified as one of the more
successful distinctive American institutions along with the family farm, our
higher educational system and constitutional government of checks and
balances. The industrial working class has been assimilated into the mainstream of the community, and has altered to a degree the values and direction
of the community without disruptive conflict or alienation and with a
stimulus to economic efficiency. This is no mean achievement in an industrial
society."9
This system is alluring to public employees for the same reasons which
make it attractive to private employees. Aside from hoping to achieve economic benefits through collective strength, employees also expect that the
negotiation process, as well as the organizational activity which takes place
within a union, will provide an opportunity to participate in matters affecting their own welfare."
The fruits of collective bargaining are the contracts and grievance procedures to which the parties agree. These contracts and procedures generally have a high degree of acceptability because the practices represent the
work product of individual effort and compromise. The parties sit across
the bargaining table, more or less as equals, and formally agree on rules of
conduct and substantive conditions.7' Their agreements thus carry a moral
as well as a legal obligation," and are inclined to be more acceptable than
67See Williams, Settlement of Labor Disputes in Industries Affected with a National Interest,
49 A.B.A.J. 862, 866-67 (1963).
" The alternative most commonly advanced

is compulsory arbitration, which is opposed by

both management and labor. This opposition was demonstrated on August 9, 1966, when the
American Bar Association's Section of Labor Relations Law voted down a resolution urging compulsory arbitration as the terminal dispute settlement procedure in the railroad, airline, and maritime industries. BNA, LABOR RELATIONS YEARBOOK-1966, at 91, 92 (1967).
69Raskin & Dunlop, Two Views of Collective Bargaining, in CHALLENGES TO COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING 155, 172 (L. Ulman ed. 1967).
70See id. at 171-72.
" The president of the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees,
AFL-CIO, has referred to collective bargaining as "a process that transforms pleading to negotiations. It is a process that permits employees dignity as they participate in the formulation of
their terms and conditions of employment. . . . Collective bargaining is a process that occurs
among equals." Wall Street J., Sept. 15, 1967, at 18, col. 3.
72 As a legal obligation, a collective bargaining contract may be enforced in court under 5
301(a) of the Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 29 U.S.C. S 185(a)
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determinations promulgated by a third party, whether that party be a
board of compulsory arbitration or a legislative body. Also, when employees and employers fashion their own procedures and conditions, they
tend to tailor-make the practices to meet special needs and remedy specific
problems. Given the proper incentives, they can usually do this better than
anyone else because of their intimate knowledge of their own operations.
There is a personal as well as a collective aspect to collective bargaining.
It is self-evident that the collective economic package which the system
yields to the American worker is generally very attractive. But the more
significant contribution to the American way of life may be the almost
invisible personal aspect of the system. Members of the general public who
derive their knowledge of the subject solely from newspaper accounts of
strikes and wage settlements may be unaware of what collective bargaining actually means to the union worker. In a society where self-employment has practically disappeared73 and where most workers are employed
by large corporations, collective bargaining provides a form of economic
due process which would otherwise be unavailable, unless provided by governmental regulations far more pervasive than those which now exist. Most
labor relations laws are designed to protect and regulate the institution of
collective bargaining.74 Except as to minimum requirements for wages and
overtime," and protection against various forms of discrimination," the law
leaves it to the parties to determine for themselves, through bargaining,
applicable rates of pay and other conditions of employment, including such
items as seniority, job security, and grievance procedures. These latter
items are the basic ingredients in the prevailing system of industrial due
process. Rules which the parties adopt to govern job tenure, and procedures
(1964). See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). Collective bargaining
contracts under the Railway Labor Act are enforceable through adjustment board and federal
court procedures under §§ 3m and 3p, and § 204, 45 U.S.C. §§ 153(m), (p), and 184 (1964);
see InternationaJ Ass'n of Machinists v. Central Airlines, Inc., 372 U.S. 682 (1963); Comment,
Review of Adjustment Board Awards Under the Railway Labor Act, 34 J. AIR L. & Com. 233
(1968).
73 A survey of the years 1962-1967, based on Bureau of Labor Statistics figures, shows an
annual decrease in the relatively small number of self-employed workers in the United States.
Non-agricultural

self-employed

Agricultural self-employed
Total of employed

1962

1963

1964

1965

1966

1967

6,271*

6,195

6,266

6,213

5,991

5,181

2,619
66,702

2,437
2,366
2,307 2,135
1,999
67,762 69,305 71,088 72,898 74,292

* In thousands
BNA, LABOR RELATIONS YEARBOOK-1967,

at 526 (1968).

" E.g., National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §
U.S.C. §§
5

151-88

(1964); WIs.

STAT. ANN.

§§

151-68

111.01-19

(1964); Railway Labor Act, 45

(1957).

' E.g., Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 1060, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19
(1964).
" Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 2000e to 2000e-15 (1964); Age
Discrimination
in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 2-16, 81 Stat. 602.
77
The Supreme Court in NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 488 (1960),
summed up the proper approach for the National Labor Relations Board in a system "where the
Government does not attempt to control the results of negotiations," stating that:
It is apparent from the legislative history of the whole Act that the policy of
Congress is to impose a mutual duty upon the parties to confer in good faith with a
desire to reach agreement, in the belief that such an approach from both sides of the
table promotes the over-all design of achieving industrial peace. . . . But apart from
this essential standard of conduct, Congress intended that the parties should have
wide latitude in their negotiations, unrestricted by any governmental power to regulate the substantive solution of their differences.
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which they establish for settling disputes, including arbitration, give the
worker a legal right to fair treatment and the means to enforce that right."
As a member of the bargaining unit, which is his immediate industrial
community, the employee helps determine the substantive terms of the
collective agreement. By these collective, but nevertheless personal, actions
the industrial working class is thus "assimilated in the mainstream of the
community." 9
Deploring the passing of the American frontier, Walter Prescott Webb
observed that: "The modern individual . . . finds himself cut off from the
frontier where work could always be found and barred by the machine
which is doing more and more of the work left to be done in civilization.
It is a situation in which he feels quite useless, baffled, and defeated.""
In Webb's view, the individual was becoming relatively less important,
losing his identity in a growing corporate life. Yet this was not an expression of hopeless pessimism, for Webb identified the underlying question as
"whether we can manage what we have so eagerly taken?"" He discerned
in the question a challenge and an opportunity: "Our challenge consists in
finding out what modifications should be made, and our opportunity will
come in making them.""
I am not suggesting that collective bargaining has become a substitute
for the frontier--even in part. I do suggest, however, that in seeking responses to Webb's underlying question we may discover that for most
working people the need for self-expression and for participation in the
determination of their own economic destiny is, to a considerable extent,
satisfied by collective bargaining. While labor unions can be impersonaleven tyrannical-most unions at least provide an opportunity for the employee to share, with his fellow employees, in a degree of control over the
conditions of his employment. Whether he avails himself of this opportunity is another matter. To the extent that this opportunity is not available,
society's corrective efforts ought to be concentrated on insuring the essentially democratic nature of the union itself, " a subject which is beyond
the scope of this paper. But, for purposes of our present inquiry, the message which we cannot avoid is that the personal aspect of collective bargaining, which tends to satisfy the individual worker's craving for economic self-determination, is as valid for employees of government as for
employees of General Motors.
Is this also true of the collective aspect of collective bargaining? It is the
collective aspect which forces the employer into agreement with the union.
"'As the Supreme Court explained in United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 580 (1960), "A collective bargaining agreement is an effort to
erect a system of industrial self-government." Cf. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Steele
v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); Rubber Workers Local 12, 150 N.L.R.B. 312
(1964), enforced, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967).
"' Raskin & Dunlop, Two Views of Collective Bargaining, in CHALLENGES TO COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING 155, 172 (L. Ulman ed. 1967).
"W.

WEBB, THE GREAT FRONTIER

128

(1964).

'lid. at 418.
" 1d.
"This was an objective of the Landrum-Griffin Act (Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959), 29 U.S.C.

§§ 401-531

(1964).
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The collective action of a strike, whether real or potential, is the power that
the union brings to the bargaining table. Although a union may afford its
officers and members occasions for the exercise of both leadership and persuasiveness, the union's ultimate success in the bargaining process depends
upon the power of the employees, acting in concert, to withhold their services. In the private sector this is counter-balanced by the employer's power
to resist union demands and to lock-out under certain conditions, thereby creating an approximate equilibrium which usually makes collective
bargaining work. Collective bargaining is not to be equated with enlightened persuasion. "The system has not reached the ideal of the philosophic
notion that perfect understanding among people would lead to perfect
agreement among them on values. The presence of economic weapons in
reserve, and their actual exercise on occasion by the parties, is part and
parcel of the system . . . ."" Remove the weapons from either side, and
collective bargaining-at least as we now know it-vanishes.86
Is the strike weapon then essential to collective bargaining? Even if we
limit our question to strikes of public employees, we will find no simple
answer. Public employment and public management differ markedly from
their counterparts in private industry. It should, therefore, not be surprising that the function of the strike is not the same in the two sectors, and
that collective bargaining, whatever shape it ultimately assumes in the
public sector, must differ substantially from collective bargaining in the
private sector.
In private industry, where the employer competes for profits, the economic pressures at work in a strike or in the threat of a strike are unlike
those created by similar activity directed against the governmental employer. The government is not in business to make a profit; its business is to
provide a service to the public. Furthermore, the lines of authority in government employment are frequently unclear. Rarely will a governmental
representative at the bargaining table have full authority to grant wage
increases. Across-the-board wage increases for government workers usually require appropriations from the taxing authority, whether it be a state
legislature, a city council, a school board, or other taxing unit. Sometimes
there will be a combination of legislative bodies sharing the money-raising
function, as when state and local funds are combined to finance a local
school system. An additional factor is the diffusion of political activity
among elected and appointed officials. In the typical governmental structure elected officials must be alert to the whims and wishes of the voters, a
"'See American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965); NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S.
278 (1965); NLRB v. Teamsters Local 449 (Buffalo Linen case), 353 U.S. 87 (1957).
'NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960). The Court also quoted the
following, more idealistic passage from Cox, The Duty To Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARV. L.
REV. 1401, 1409 (1958), to describe the dual existence of the statutory command to bargain
in good faith and the availability of economic devices: "Initially it may be only fear of the
economic consequences of disagreement that turns the parties to facts, reason, a sense of responsibility, a responsiveness to government and public opinion, and moral principle; but in time these
forces generate their own compulsions, and negotiating a contract approaches the ideal of informed persuasion." Id. at 489-90.
8See Aaron, Emergency Dispute Settlement, in SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION, LABOR
LAW DEVELOPMENTS--1967, at 185
(1967); Levinson, The Locomotive Firemen's Dispute, 17
LABOR L.J. 671 (1966).
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group which includes both taxpayers and union members. On the other
hand, appointed officials may have the normal managerial desire for efficiency and economy yet lack the stimuli of profit and loss statements and
competitive cost accounting to spur development of streamlined methods
and late-model technology.
This enumeration of some of the essential differences between public
and private sector employment omits the matter of sovereignty. It should
not be significant that the employer is the "sovereign," notwithstanding
conventional wisdom which teaches that bargaining with and striking
against government are per se illegal because they challenge the exclusive
authority of the sovereign to legislate terms and conditions of employment for government servants. This theory is akin to the doctrine of sovereign immunity," which had its roots in the ancient and discredited
maxim that "The King can do no wrong."" It is a wonder that sovereign
immunity ever became established in a democracy; but it is not sacrosanct.
It has been whittled away and chipped at by statutes" and cases,9 so that
private citizens may now sue their government in many areas of law and
conduct. Similar accommodation can surely be effected in the matter of
sovereignty over the employment relation." The real question is not
whether collective bargaining and strikes by public employees can be legalized, but the more pragmatic one of whether collective bargaining can
be adapted or modified to meet the special needs of the public sector.
Similarities between some governmental functions, especially the socalled proprietary functions, and comparable private operations are deceptive. From the standpoint of both the employee and the consumer there
is no practical difference between a regulated privately-owned public utility, such as a transit company, and a governmental enterprise performing
the same function. This is illustrated by the history of public transit in
San Antonio and Dallas. In both cities, unionized private transit companies
recently were taken over by public authorities, whereupon the collective
bargaining rights of the employees instantly vanished." Since Texas law
prohibited recognition of the employees' unions, the resulting problemswhich included a brief strike by the Dallas employees"-boiled down to a
lack of communication. There were no means through which the parties
8 The doctrine of sovereign immunity in the United States was first enunciated by Chief
Justice John Marshall in The Schooner Exchange v. M'Fadden, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
"SRex non Potest Peccare, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 148S (4th ed. 1957). See also Note,

Torts-The Disappearing Doctrine of Governmental Immunity from Tort Liability, 26 GA. B.J.
435, 440 (1964).
89E.g., Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80 (1964). For a brief review of the
"steady encroachment upon the originally unbroken domain of sovereign immunity," see Dalehite
v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 25 n.10 (1953), and the dissent of Justice Jackson in which he
noted: "Surely a statute [Federal Tort Claims Act] so long debated was meant to embrace more
than traffic accidents. If not, the ancient and discredited doctrine that 'The King can do no wrong'
has not been uprooted; it has merely been amended to read, 'The King can do only little wrongs.'
Id. at 60.
0
9 E.g., Kawananokoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349 (1907); Bank of the United States v.
Planter's Bank of Georgia, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904 (1824).
" The concept of sovereignty was no impediment to Canada, which recently enacted legislation legalizing strikes among certain federal employees. Public Service Staff Relations Act, 1967,
CAN.9 2 REV. STAT. c. 72, § 101, at 757 (1967).
See notes 41-48 supra, and accompanying text.
" Dallas Times Herald, Oct. 1, 1966, § A, at 23, col. 4.
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could talk to each other-they lacked a system of effective communication,
which may be the essence of collective bargaining. The bus operator probably did not understand why his bargaining rights should be different because his employer happened to be a city rather than a private company.
And from the standpoint of the public, the immediate impact of a transit
strike was not altered by the change in ownership.
While the Dallas-San Antonio situation points up a need for communication (i.e., some form of collective bargaining) the means of communication need not be exactly the same form of collective bargaining that existed when the transit systems were operated under private ownership. For
notwithstanding the similarities between the private and public sectors,
strikes by public employees have distinguishing features. The sheer display
of public employee strike power, quiescent or active, is capable of doing
much more than close the gap between wages in the public and private
sectors. Unlike the private sector, in the public sector there are no adequate forces to counterbalance strike action.94 Thus, if organized public
employees were to become powerful enough, they could use the strike
weapon as a blackjack to demand more and more, regardless of the equities of their case. If unlimited use of the strike were available to public
employees, their collective bargaining achievements would depend more
upon the community's dependence on their services than upon any rational
economic yardstick. Employee self-restraint and public opinion would
hardly be adequate to prevent extortionate settlements in many cases. But
certain strikes could be tolerated. While a community could not endure a
prolonged strike of policemen, firemen, or hospital employees, a strike of
public librarians or of gardeners in the public parks would probably have
little impact on community life. At least for these groups, to cite only
the extreme examples, if collective bargaining is to be successful it cannot
be dependent solely on the right to strike.
Supposition. The opinion which I draw from the above discussion is that
most of the existing laws prohibiting strikes will be unsuccessful unless
they offer an adequate substitute for the strike. Public employees will continue to organize, and when organized they will demand improvements in
their employment status and back their demands with the ability to strike.
Public employees, including teachers and other white collar groups, have
discovered that which the private sector labor movement and the civil
rights movement discovered earlier-society helps those who help themselves. Yet there are some strikes which, by their duration or by the nature of the services affected, the public cannot tolerate. A substitute for
these strikes must be found.
We should be wary, however, in our search for a fair and adequate substitute for the strike. Since we should try to preserve the do-it-yourself
aspect of collective bargaining, we must avoid throwing out the baby with
the bath. We may be unable to devise a system which will guarantee that
there will never be any strikes of public employees; it is doubtful if any
94 See note 62 supra.
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such system could be achieved short of a police state. We should, however,
develop a collective bargaining system especially adapted to the needs of
public employment, recognizing that some strikes of public employees

might serve a long-range purpose and not be detrimental to the public
welfare. But primarily we should concentrate on devising substitutes for
strikes and lockouts that will implement rather than destroy collective bargaining.
Since the form which collective bargaining takes in the private sector
cannot and should not be duplicated in the public sector, we have an opportunity for innovation and experimentation. The dearth of public collective bargaining enabling statutes and the lack of any real tradition of
collective bargaining among government employees may prove to be advantages. The undeveloped quality of this phenomenon could stimulate
truly creative approaches. And from a political standpoint, the very absence of strong vested interests at this early stage of public employee
unionization affords an opportunity for fashioning new solutions-solutions which might also be transferrable to disputes in the private sector
where public welfare is jeopardized by prolonged strikes in certain vital
industries.

II.

DEFINING PUBLIC POLICY

In attempting to define what public policy ought to be, it is inevitable
that we begin with certain arbitrary assumptions. I believe these assumptions to be valid, however, for they are consistent with the policy toward
organized labor which prevails generally in the American economy. Moreover, they are based on a concept of fairness which should be an essential
element in a democratic institution. These assumptions will be the yardstick by which we shall measure proposed legislation designed to regulate
employment relations for public employees.

First. Compensation and conditions of employment for public employees should be comparable to that prevailing in private employment for
work which requires similar qualifications (i.e., similar skill, ability, and
training) and which is performed under similar conditions.
Second. In general, strikes in the public sector should be avoided. In
particular,strikes of governmental employees which endanger the health,
safety, or welfare of the public should be prohibited.
Third. Consistent with the wishes of the employees expressed in appropriate employee units, and subject to the limitations imposed by the public
welfare, wages and conditions of employment for public employees ought
to be established by a bilateral bargaining process between the employer
and the employees' organizationalrepresentative-aform of collective bargaining adapted to the peculiar needs of governmental employment. To the
extent that this adaptation diminishes the right to strike, the available
alternatives should encourage the parties to reach their own agreements
with minimum reliance upon settlements imposed by third party intervention.
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Fourth. In most instances, third party intervention should be limited to
mediation and voluntary arbitration.But if the parties have been unable to
agree upon a voluntary settlement and if the public health, welfare, or
safety is endangered by a strike, submission of the dispute to quasi-judicial
arbitrationshould be required. The function of such arbitrationshould be
limited to ascertaining and applying the wages and conditions of employment prevailing for comparable work in the same labor market area in the
private sector.
Fifth. The determination of when and whether the public health, welfare, or safety is being endangered by a threatened or existing strike of
public employees should be a judicial function. The decision should be
made by a court of equity having the usual equitable powers of injunction
and contempt.
Although I have characterized the above assumptions as arbitary, strong
reasons support this definition of proposed public policy.
As to the first assumption, it may seem a truism that public employees
ought to work under salaries and conditions similar to those prevailing in
the private sector. But most employees of state and local governmental
units do not.9" Implementation of this premise would cost many communities a great deal of money, and higher taxes are never popular. Nevertheless, a system premised on substandard compensation for governmental
employees is indefensible, and every effort ought to be made to bring public wage scales in line with those of the private sector. Any community
which fails to make this effort should expect discontent among its public
servants. The federal government is already dedicated to the standard of
wage comparability. At least as a moral commitment, Congress has declared that "[f]ederal pay rates be comparable with private enterprise pay
rates for the same levels of work."" For "general schedule" employees, this
principle must be implemented from time to time by direct congressional
action. But many federal employees, most notably blue collar "Wage
Board" employees, are excluded from coverage of the general schedule."
Their wages are "fixed and adjusted from time to time as nearly as is consistent with public interest in accordance with prevailing rates.""
" The salaries paid to school teachers are an example. The training and ability of teachers
ordinarily command much greater compensation when sold in the private labor market. See note
62 supra.
"Federal Salary Act of 1962, 5 U.S.C. § 5301 (Supp. II, 1967).
9'5 U.S.C. § 5102 (c) (7) (1964) excludes from coverage of the General Schedule and the
Civil Service classification system "employees in recognized trades or crafts, or other skilled mechanical crafts, or in unskilled, semiskilled, or skilled manual-labor occupations, and other employees including foremen and supervisors in positions having trade, craft, or laboring experience
and knowledge as the paramount requirement.
...and also certain Bureau of Engraving employees.
98 $ U.S.C. § 5341 (a) (1964). Although this general provision for prevailing rates does not
apply to such bodies as the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the
Panama Canal Company, for most such agencies the wage rates for trades, crafts and labor employees are also fixed and adjusted in accordance with prevailing standards. Federal Personnel Manual
System Letter No. 532-2, U.S. Civil Service Comm'n, Dec. 1, 1967, at 4.
The federal commitment to the prevailing wage concept is further illustrated by the longstanding practice of requiring private contractors to pay prevailing wage rates (and fringe benefits since 1964) on federal projects and on federally assisted projects. Davis-Bacon Act of 1931,
46 Star. 1494, as amended, 40-U.S.C. § 276a to 276a-7 (1964). "[T]he minimum wages to be
paid various classes of laborers and mechanics shall be based upon the wages that will be deter-
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For example, the Tennessee Valley Authority enabling Act provides
that laborers and mechanics employed by TVA shall be paid not less than
the rates that prevail in the vicinity for similar work." The fact that federal pay scales generally compare favorably with those of private employment has undoubtedly been an element contributing to the absence of
strikes in the federal service. Adoption of the principle of equal pay for
equal work for non-federal public employees would certainly eliminate
one major cause of strikes.
The prevailing wage concept which is here proposed contains one detail
which differs from the usual concept. The private sector area of comparison should be the labor market area rather than an arbitrary political or
geographical unit.0 This provides a more realistic standard of comparison. Depending on the types of jobs in question, a labor market area might
even encompass a multi-state region. For example, the labor market area
for schoolteachers in one of the New England states would include, at the
very least, all of the New England states and perhaps several other northeastern states. On the other hand, the labor market area for unskilled
labor in a given city or county might be confined to the immediate geographical vicinity.
The second assumption as to public policy is supported by the recent
history of strikes among public employees. Although efforts should be
made to avoid such strikes, an absolute prohibition on all strike activity
is likely to be self-defeating for reasons previously discussed. However,
our urban society cannot tolerate a total or extended work stoppage of
employees engaged in certain vital services. Therefore, strikes, by their
duration or by the nature of the services affected, which pose a danger to
the health, safety, or welfare of the public must be prohibited. The extent
of the prohibition, however, should depend on the time and circumstances
of the particular labor dispute, not upon an a priori legislative classification that some services are vital and are therefore nonstrikable, while others
are not. It is unfeasible-if not totally impossible-to devise such a classification. Does a strike of schoolteachers endanger the welfare of the public? Might not the answer depend on the timing and extent of the strike?. 1
And what of a partial strike of firemen limited to routine non-emergency
work but with retention of personnel for full coverage of fires and other
mined by the Secretary of Labor to be prevailing for the corresponding classes of laborers and
mechanics employed on projects of a character similar to the contract work in the town, village,
or other civil subdivision of the State in which the work is to be performed .... " 40 U.S.C.
5 276a (1964).
"Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933, 16 U.S.C. § 831 (1964). See VanMol, The TVA
Experience, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE: THEORY AND PRACTICE 85
(K. Warner ed. 1967).
100Prevailing wage statutes usually provide for comparison with wages in the vicinity. See,
for example, the Davis-Bacon and TVA standards. Davis-Bacon Act of 1931, 46 Stat. 1494,
as amended, 40 U.S.C. § 276a to 276a-7 (1964); Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933, 16
U.S.C. § 831 (1964). And see note 98 supra.
"e' Cf. School Dist. for the City of Holland v. Holland Educ. Ass'n, 157 N.W.2d 206 (Mich.
1968), in which the Supreme Court of Michigan reversed the issuance of an injunction against
striking teachers. The school district seeking the injunction had only shown that if a temporary
order did not issue, the schools would not open on schedule. The court held "such showing insufficient to have justified the exercise of the plenary power of equity by the force of injunction."
157 N.W.2d at 210.
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emergencies? A strike of transit workers in one city might be only an inconvenience because of the availability of alternative transportation,
whereas in another city a transit strike might paralyze the economic life of
the community and be more of a catastrophe than an inconvenience. And
is there not an essential difference between a strike of sanitation men occurring in the frozen winter months, and a strike of the same workers in
the hot summer months? And does not the duration of such a strike also
make a difference? No legislature should attempt to define with particularity which strikes should be prohibited and which should be legal. Aside
from the political considerations which would invariably influence the enactment of such provisions, such an approach should not be attempted because no legislature can foresee, and thus adequately describe, all of the
contingencies which would render some strikes lawful and others unlawful.
As stated in the fifth assumption, the task of deciding whether a strike of
public employees endangers the health, welfare, or safety of the public
ought to be left to the courts for decision on an ad hoc basis.
The third assumption endorses collective bargaining as the favored
method of determining wages and conditions of public employment. The
advantages of such a bilateral process have already been discussed. As we
observed, the form which such bargaining must take in the public sector
must be adapted to the peculiar needs of that sector. This is so not only because government employment and government management differ in certain significant respects from their counterparts in the private sector, but
also because diminution of the right to strike in public employment will in
itself change the nature of the bargaining process. If the voluntary and
flexible nature of the process is to be maintained, it is essential that the
available alternatives to strikes and lockouts furnish the parties with sufficient incentive to reach, without compulsion, an accord which will be
compatible with the public interest.
The fourth assumption recognizes that there will be disputes which the
parties themselves cannot or will not settle without third party intervention. When such disputes involve critical services, curtailment of which
would endanger the community, settlement ought not to depend on the
coercive effect which a strike or lockout might have on the community.
But in most instances third party intervention need not mean third party
determination. Experience has demonstrated the value of mediation as a
catalyst in producing bilateral settlement of labor disputes."2 Considering the nature of public employment and the need to exhaust every reasonable effort to achieve voluntary adjustment, mediation should be required in every labor dispute where the governmental unit and the public
employee representative are unable to achieve a peaceful settlement.' But
in those situations where mediation has failed and where the parties have
refused voluntary arbitration, and if the public health, welfare, or safety
'o' See Aaron, Emergency Dispute Settlement,
LAW DEvELOIPMENTS-1967, at 185 (1967).
"Compulsory
mediation under the Railway
amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 155-56 (1964), has had
to continue bargaining. Thus more settlements are

in SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION, LABOR
Labor Act §§ 5-6, 44 Stat. 580 (1926), as
the salutary effect of forcing disputing parties
reached and many strikes are avoided.
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is being jeopardized by threat or continuation of a strike, some other settlement device must be provided. A device which is consistent with the public policy here assumed is a form of quasi-judicial arbitration in which the
board of arbitration serves essentially as a fact-finding body to ascertain
comparable wages and conditions in the appropriate labor market area.
But unlike the fact-finding or emergency boards provided by many existing statutes, ' this board would make a binding determination, applying
the prevailing wages and conditions to the public jobs in dispute.
This is not a proposal for compulsory arbitration in the conventional
sense. A major objection to compulsory arbitration of public employee
labor disputes is that legislative bodies are naturally reluctant to delegate
to an outside authority the power to determine how and in what amount
public money will be spent. Indeed, serious constitutional questions would
probably have to be answered if such authority were delegated without
fixed standards. The present proposal not only includes fixed standards but
also eliminates most of the discretionary or legislative aspects usually associated with compulsory arbitration. ' The proposed board would make
determinations in a manner similar to the federal "wage boards,' '.. or to
the determinations made by the Secretary of Labor under the TVA
Act"" and under Davis-Bacon procedures for establishing prevailing wages
on federally related construction projects."' Knowing, at least in a general
way, how this board of arbitration would arrive at its decision, each of
the disputing parties might not have a counter-incentive to avoid good
faith bargaining in the hope or expectation that the Board would render a
more satisfactory determination than they could negotiate themselves.'"
How this board would function in relation to other proposed machinery
for settlement of public employee disputes will be discussed after presentation of the entire plan.
104 E.g.,

Railway Labor Act, 44 Stat. 486 (1926),

45 U.S.C.

5

160 (1964); Labor Manage-

ment Relations Act, 1947 (Taft-Hartley), 61 Stat. 152-55, 29 U.S.C. §§ 171-76 (1964); N.Y.
Civ. SEarv. LAW §§ 205-10 (McKinney Supp. 1967).
'° E.g., The Australian Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904-50, II AUSTL. COM. ACTS
1036 (1950), provides for compulsory arbitration and permits the Conciliation and Arbitration
Commission to include in its award any matter which it thinks necessary or expedient to settle
the dispute or to prevent future disputes.
o See notes 96-97 supra.
'Tennessee
Valley Authority Act of 1933, 16 U.S.C. § 831 (1964).
108Davis-Bacon Act of 1931, 46 Star. 1494, as amended, 40 U.S.C. §§ 276a to 276a-5 (1964);
29 C.F.R. §§ 1.1-15 (1968). See note 98 supra.
" There is a popular conception that compulsory arbitration destroys the incentive to engage
in genuine collective bargaining, and the experience under the War Labor Board is often cited
to prove the point. WLB Chairman Edwin E. Witte challenged the popular impression "that collective bargaining virtually ceased, being replaced by governmental determination of labor conditions; that because there was a War Labor Board, the parties made no serious effort to settle their
own difficulties; and that as a result minor grievances which should have been settled locally
were magnified into serious disputes." He stated that:
As with all other myths which have developed out of our wartime experience, there
is some truth in these generally held views regarding collective bargaining during the
war. . . . Beyond question, the fact that there was a War Labor Board often led
the parties 'to pass the buck' to the Board in disputes which they should have
settled themselves. As always happens when new adjustment machinery is created,
the existence of the Board probably resulted in its getting many disputes for settlement which would have been settled in some other way or would have remained
unsettled without resulting in strikes.
But this is not the entire story. . . - [T]he great majority of the collective
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The fifth policy assumption is that it should be the function of the
courts to determine when and whether a particular strike-actual or
threatened-constitutes a danger to the health, welfare, or safety of the
public. The State of Vermont has pioneered in this approach. Its 1967
state labor relations act"' does not outlaw strikes of public employees as
such, nor does it specify penalties for public employees who engage in
strikes. Instead, it leaves to the courts the determination, on an ad hoc
basis, of when and if a public employee's act of striking endangers the
public health, safety, or welfare. Section 32 of that statute declares:
No public employee may strike or recognize a picket line of a labor organization while performing his official duties, if the strike or recognition of a
picket line will endanger the health, safety or welfare of the public. The
public employer concerned may petition for an injunction or other appropriate relief from the court of chancery within the county wherein such
.strike or recognition of a picket line in violation of this section is occurring
or is about to occur.
This procedure contains the usual advantage of due process, including
availability of appellate review, found in the American judicial system.
But it has the further advantages of uncertainty and flexibility. Uncertainty can be an advantage when one of the policy objectives is to encourage
the parties to settle their own disputes. Flexibility is also an advantage because a court, relatively without fear of political reprisal, can tailor-make
its equitable orders to fit the circumstances and can apply appropriate contempt penalties for violation of those orders. And by omitting from the
statute specific penalties for striking, the courts and the other branches of
government are spared the shameful spectacle which results from a failure
to apply statutory penalties. As we have noted, the price of labor peace too
often has required law enforcement agencies to look the other way in order
to induce striking employees to return to work. Whether the proposed
judicial procedures will be more successful than those which were described
in the opening section of this paper is a matter which will be considered in
conjunction with our appraisal of the entire plan.
III. A

STATUTORY PROPOSAL

A law which embodies the essential elements of the foregoing statement
of policy might seem too restrictive to some militant unionists and too
permissive to some employers and public officials. But having no electorate
to answer to, I shall rush in, proposal in hand, where wise legislators may
fear to tread. It is not my intention, however, to spell out the details of a
"model" statute. But I am hopeful that my proposal may help stimulate
thoughtful and bold consideration of new methods for settling public
bargaining agreements of wartime were negotiated directly between the parties,
without the War Labor Board's having to settle even a single issue. . . . In the cases
referred to the Board, moreover, it was rare that the parties were in disagreement
on all issues. Typically, they had worked out most of the provisions of their agreement, with only relatively few issues referred to the Board for decision.
Witte, Wartime Handling of Labor Disputes, 25 HARV. Bus. REv. 169, 177 (1946).
"0VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§
Id. § 1704.

SI'

1701-05

(Supp. 1968).
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employee disputes-methods which will adapt and preserve, consistent
with the public interest, the voluntary and democratic qualities of collective bargaining. I suggest that one type of statute which would serve this
purpose would be one containing provisions for the following items.
(1) There shall be a statutory declaration of public policy which recognizes that compensation and other conditions of employment for public
employees shall be comparable to private sector employment, based upon
wages and conditions prevailing in the same labor market area for jobs requiring similar qualifications, i.e., jobs needing similar skill, ability, and
training, and performed under similar conditions."'
(2) Public employees shall have (a) the right to organize into labor
organizations, and to form, join or assist labor organizations, (b) the right
to engage in lawful concerted activity for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, (c) the right to select their
representatives according to their own free choice. In general, these rights
shall be comparable to the rights guaranteed private sector employees under sections 7 and 8 of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended."'
They shall be enforceable through an employee relations board similar to
the National Labor Relations Board. This board shall determine appropriate bargaining units, conduct representation elections, certify exclusive
bargaining agents based on majority representation, and find and remedy
unfair labor practices when protected rights have been violated."'
(3) A public employer and a union representing a majority of the
employees in an appropriate public employee bargaining unit shall be
required to bargain collectively in good faith."' To bargain collectively
shall include meeting at reasonable times and conferring in good faith
with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, and the execution of a written contract, ordinance, or resolution
incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party or required by a board or arbitration pursuant to the statute.
(4) In every dispute concerning the negotiation of new or modified
terms and conditions of employment in which the parties, through bilateral negotiations, are unable to reach a settlement, mediation shall be pro-

vided. "' The mediator, preferably one who is the mutual choice of the
112For example, one of the "similar conditions" which would be considered in comparing
police jobs would be the hazardous nature of the work.
"'49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 157-8 (1964).
114 These provisions are similar to those already found in the newer state public employee relations acts. See note 38 supra. See also Federal Executive Order 10988, notes 33-35 supra. According to Dr. Robert D. Helsby, Chairman of the New York Public Employment Relations
Board, "The provision of a formula through which public employees may win recognition without strikes automatically removes the greatest single cause for recent walkouts of teachers and

civil service workers in many parts of the nation." N.Y. Times, May 5, 1968, at 82, col. I
(city ed.).
...
This provision is common to all labor relations statutes which have followed the basic pattern
of the Wagner Act. National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151-68 (1964). Admittedly, a requirement that wages for public employees be set by collective
contract will require some adjustment by all parties. For example, bargaining and contracts periods
would have to be correlated with budget and tax determinations and perhaps even bond issues.
These adjustments would not be easy, but they are not impossible.
.. See similar requirements under the Railway Labor Act §§
as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 155-56 (1964).

5-6, 44 Stat. 580-82

(1926),
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parties, shall use his best efforts, through mediation, to bring about an
agreement. Upon exhaustion of mediation, voluntary arbitration shall be
proffered and encouraged." '
(5) While pre-mediation negotiations are in progress, and while a dispute is still subject to mediation or voluntary arbitration, both parties
shall maintain the status quo-wages and other conditions of employment
shall not be altered by the employer and the employees shall not engage in

a strike or other concerted work stoppage. " '
(6) Following the exhaustion of bargaining and mediation, strikes of
public employees would not be absolutely prohibited."' The statute shall
contain, however, a general provision to the effect that it shall be unlawful
for a public employee to engage in a strike or other concerted work stoppage which endangers the health, welfare, or safety of the public. This
provision shall be enforceable in the courts by injunction or other appropriate equitable remedy, including contempt proceedings, but the statute
itself shall not specify penalties for striking.'
(7) In every case in which a court of competent jurisdiction issues an
injunction against a strike of public employees, and only in such a case, the
parties shall be required to submit their dispute to a board of arbitration
for final and binding determination. The members of the arbitration
board shall be selected according to procedures which will assure their
impartiality. The function of such board shall be to hold hearings and take
evidence to determine the wages and conditions in dispute, based upon
findings of comparable wages and conditions in the same labor market area
in the private sector. Judicial review of the board's award shall be limited
and the substantial evidence rule shall be applicable."'
IV.

CONCLUSION

The foregoing policy assumptions and the accompanying statutory proposal.'. are not intended as a substitute for voluntary collective bargaining.
My object has been to develop a legal framework in which bilateral bargaining can occur in the public sector without serious disruption of the
community welfare. If such a plan were to result in substitution of third
". This requirement is also found in §§ 5 and 7-10 of the Railway Labor Act, 44 Stat. 580,
582-86 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 155, 157-60 (1964), where it has not had notable
success. However, the structure of the Railway Labor Act and established practice offer little
incentive for the parties to submit major disputes to voluntary arbitration.
'SSee Railway Labor Act § 6, 44 Stat. 582 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 156 (1964),
and Manning v. American Airlines, Inc., 329 F.2d 32, 34 (2d Cir. 1964), holding that "[t]he
effect of § 6 is to prolong agreements subject to its provisions regardless of what they say as to
termination."
.2.Strikes occurring prior to exhaustion of these statutory procedures would be unlawful.
120 See notes 110, 111 supra, and accompanying text.

12'See 4 K. DAVis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 29.01, at 114 (1958).
.aaThe proposed statute is intended as a general statement orly, and no effort has been made
to write detailed legislative provisions. Numerous variations in procedure could be devised, and
local conditions might dictate some of these variations. For example, it is not relevant to the
central theme of this paper to treat the matter of compulsory unionism for public employees. A
union shop provision would certainly be consistent with the policy expressed herein, but a state
might choose to outlaw the union shop and still adhere to the basic points contained in this proposal. Likewise no recommendation is made as to whether the boards of arbitration in paragraph 7
of the proposal shall be permanent or ad hoc.

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 22

party determination for collective bargaining, the plan will have failed.
The features which are relied upon to encourage good faith bargaining
while minimizing strikes are (1) a statutory declaration of the standard of
comparability with private sector employment, (2) protection of the right
to organize and provision for union recognition and mandatory collective
bargaining when desired by a majority of the employees in an appropriate
bargaining unit, (3) establishment of adequate machinery to enforce and
administer these provisions, (4) compulsory mediation to aid the parties
in reaching their own settlement, (5) encouragement of voluntary arbitration, and (6) the uncertain availability of strikes, judicial intervention,
and binding quasi-judicial arbitration when the parties are unable or unwilling to arrive at a settlement." The feature of uncertainty is crucial to
the plan. Under the proposal, neither party, acting alone, can invoke arbitration as such. There is no certainty that a court would intervene if the
employees should decide to strike-or at least no certainty as to when and
how such intervention would occur. Rather than risk a strike and/or
judicial intervention, with binding mandatory arbitration available only
when the court chooses to enjoin a strike, it is expected that in most instances the parties will either write their own contract or join in a submission to voluntary binding arbitration.
Some strikes are bound to occur. But this should not be too high a price
to pay for a relatively free system of collective bargaining. However, the
severity and duration of these strikes would be subject to judicial control
whenever the public health, welfare, or safety is in danger. It may be anticipated that the courts will establish, on a case-by-case basis, a body of
law-perhaps differing substantially from one jurisdiction to anotherwhich would define the elements required for judicial relief in a strike of
public employees. The judiciary, building on experience and stare decisis,
is better equipped to perform this function than either the legislative or
executive branches. A court is less likely to be influenced by political pressures. Furthermore, a court of equity has great flexibility in fashioning
remedies. For example, rather than issuing a strike injunction, a court
might deliberately withhold such relief for a stipulated period for the purpose of inducing the parties to reach an agreement.
Under the plan, when a court finds the requisite danger to the public
and enjoins a strike, the dispute automatically proceeds to arbitration."'
The uncertainty of judicidl intervention and the relative certainty of the
comparability standard which the board of arbitration would apply are
123Fact finding has not been included in the proposal because it would interfere with the
prospects for voluntary settlement or submission to arbitration. A board of arbitration, whether
acting pursuant to voluntary appointment by the parties or pursuant to statutory mandate following an injunction, ought not to be bound, legally or psychologically, by a prior determination of a
fact-finding board. Nor should either party be able to use fact finding as a springboard to a
higher settlement.
124In those instances in which a court would find it necessary to intervene to prevent or
stop a serious strike, it is likely that its orders would be obeyed promptly, for public opinion
would hardly support employees who are striking to obtain wages or conditions in excess of those
prevailing in private employment. But if such a strike were to continue in the face of an injunction, the court would have a wide range of contempt remedies available for enforcement of
its orders.
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factors which should encourage bargaining and settlement. A decision of
the board of arbitration, however, would not be entirely predictable. Many
variables would have to be established at the hearing. Determination of the
labor market area and the comparability of jobs, based on skill, ability,
training, and similarity of conditions of employment, leave much room for
bargaining by the parties and a broad range of decision for the board of
arbitration. The plan does not envision substituting compulsory arbitration for collective bargaining, though the nature of the bargaining would
differ from that available in the private sector.
It is to be hoped that the states will be receptive to open-minded consideration of novel approaches to the new problems which militant public
employee unions are now presenting. But collective bargaining, with all of
its advantages in the private sector, cannot be successfully transferred to
the public sector unless it is carefully modified to meet the dissimilar conditions of public employment. The modifications presented in the foregoing statutory proposal are offered as a possible means of meeting those
conditions.
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